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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000889

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SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: CONGO FEELS NO SENSE OF URGENCY ON
DARFUR

REF: USUN NEW YORK 00734

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

11. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. April 26 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consultations witnessed a veritable face-off on Darfur. In one corner was Congolese Permanent Representative (PR) and representative of the African Union (AU) Chairmanship Ikouebe, who, under obvious pressure from Paris and Khartoum, told Members that while he was sensitive to the situation in Darfur, there were other equally pressing concerns in Africa, namely Cote D'Ivoire. Ikouebe made a bid for a troop increase to the UN peacekeeping mission there and declared that the Council should wait on planning for a UN mission to Darfur. In the other corner was Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng, who began a call echoed by the majority of other Members for divining the root causes of Khartoum's opposition to a UN presence in Darfur and for the UN to proceed with its contingency planning. Ambassador Bolton stressed that the negative signal from the Government of National Unity (GNU) could not be underestimated, especially as it was impeding attempts to protect the population of Darfur.

12. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONTD. This polarization of views revealed not only the reach of Khartoum's influence, but also the breadth of France's position with regard to Sudan, as well as the AU's susceptibility to external pressures. Secretary-General (SYG) Annan, Department of Peacekeeping

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Operations (DPKO) Under-SYG Guehenno and DPKO Assistant-SYG Annabi all described the continuation of Darfur violence and the GNU's obstructionism, in the face of which the UN was persisting in its efforts to get an 'indispensable' assessment team on the ground so that a formal Council decision could be made on getting UN forces into Darfur. The

effort to secure this sequencing could be irreparably harmed by vacillation by the country at the helm of the AU and that country's effectively joining the ranks of Council spoilers to the process. It may be necessary for other parties to assume the mantle of leadership in place of Congo in the UNSC setting; both Ghana and Tanzania have demonstrated a readiness to do just that. Similarly, we have only just begun to see the obstruction to come from France on AMIS transition, especially as the realities of potential price tags and force levels (and their impact on competing French priority issues) come to pass. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

UN STILL ENGAGED ON AMIS TRANSITION . . .

13. (SBU) SYG Annan, DPKO U/SYG Guehenno and DPKO A/SYG Annabi were all on hand for April 26 UNSC consultations to update on the status of contingency planning, as mandated by OP 4 of UNSCR 1663 (2006). Annabi reported there had been no improvement in Darfur security and that escalating violence, banditry and militia movements were resulting in large-scale displacements and worsening humanitarian consequences. He acknowledged the complicating factor of Chad in undermining efforts to end the Darfur crisis and urged Members to push N'djamena and Khartoum to implement the Tripoli Agreement. On the Abuja Talks, Annabi reported a 'measure of progress,' with a complete package delivered to the parties April 25 for an envisaged April 30 adoption. U/SYG Guehenno spoke to the need for the UN to increase its engagement in Abuja, since the package would likely include provisions for AMIS transition (NOTE. At first reading, the proposed Abuja Agreement makes mention only of strengthening AMIS, not of re-hatting it. END NOTE).

14. (SBU) Guehenno and Annabi addressed continued GNU opposition to the UN's technical assessment mission, which both called 'indispensable' to the Secretariat's ability to make recommendations to the Council for its determination of

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a mandate for the eventual Darfur force. SYG Annan added that AU forces on the ground were not a substitute for the work the UN needed to do there, but he acceded that the mission could be a joint AU-UN undertaking. Despite Annabi's assurances during his visit to Sudan that the GNU would be involved every step of the way on transition contingency planning, President Bashir had declared that neither the GNU nor the Parliament could agree to such preparation or to the planned assessment mission, suggesting instead that once an Abuja agreement was reached, planning could proceed, per the Naivasha Agreement model.

15. (SBU) DPKO's planning was proceeding regardless, according to Annabi, based on the principles of establishing lasting peace and stability and of protecting civilians. He outlined (per reftel) the two broad options DPKO had developed, noting that the ultimate scale of the operation would be determined by the degree of parties' compliance with any Abuja agreement. In the absence of an agreement, Annabi warned, an organization other than the UN (the SYG suggested an unspecified 'multinational force') would have to assume responsibility for Darfur. Annabi concluded by repeating the need for an assessment team to fine-tune the work DPKO had done so far.

. . . BUT CONGO EVIDENTLY ISN'T

16. (C) Congolese PR Ikouebe began his intervention by noting Khartoum's reluctance toward AMIS transition and stressing it was up to Africans to obtain GNU consent, calling upon the AU to support its March 10 communique. Ikouebe's tone changed as he discussed the importance of reaching an April 30 Abuja agreement, insisting that with only four days to the deadline, the Council needed to stop sending 'mixed messages' which might be misconstrued by the GNU. Ikouebe said the Council should wait a week to assess Abuja results; otherwise, 'we will be faced with a war.' In an obviously

pre-cooked collaborative statement with France, he compared the Darfur situation with Cote D'Ivoire, making a bid for a troop increase to UNOCI and calling for the Council to hold off on planning for a UN Darfur mission. Qatari PR Al-Nasser cited Ikouebe's statement when voicing his own delegation's stance that DPKO planning had reached its limits and that to proceed further now would be at the expense of Abuja agreement.

17. (C) French PR de La Sabliere - after obligatory remarks about the 'indispensability' of an Abuja agreement with a credible ceasefire, the need to strengthen AMIS and the 'disturbing' reluctance displayed by the GNU - made clear his delegation's priorities with respect to a UN Darfur mission. He wanted to know how such a mission would address the situation with Chad and demanded a financial evaluation of DPKO's options, which he predicted would result in a doubling of expenditures. With Congo's statement as cover, de La Sabliere echoed Ikouebe's sentiments on Cote D'Ivoire and mentioned the draft resolution his delegation had just tabled in that regard.

GHANA RALLIES SUPPORT FOR DIVINING CAUSES OF GNU OPPOSITION

18. (C) In contrast to the Congolese statement, Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng began a call echoed by the majority of other Members for divining the root causes of Khartoum's opposition to a UN presence in Darfur and stressed the need for the UN to proceed with its contingency planning. He stressed that the Council should focus on 'making the Government of Sudan cooperative,' and he recommended using the AU and the Arab League to accomplish this task. Russian DPR Dolgov endorsed the suggestion for Arab League involvement and expressed hope that the GNU position would change, particularly regarding the assessment team.

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19. (C) Ambassador Bolton shared Effah-Apenteng's sentiments, drawing a direct correlation between the GNU's reaction to DPKO's efforts to secure entry for the assessment team with the escalation of Darfur violence. SYG Annan agreed that the GNU had not lived up to its responsibility to protect its people, a point he said he had tried repeatedly to make in letters to President Bashir and in his requests for interventions with Khartoum by African and Arab League leaders, including Egyptian President Mubarak. Annan was hopeful Khartoum would change its tune after April 30 and demonstrate its 'good faith' in the event of an Abuja agreement.

110. (C) Peruvian PR de Rivero was even more explicit about the GNU's attitude, stating that its obstructionism was nothing new, given its 'disdain' for the UN and humanitarian organizations. He urged the Council to enlist the assistance of African leaders in selling the GNU on AMIS transition, which, in his opinion, should not be conditioned on prolonged Abuja discussions. UK PR Jones Parry insisted that DPKO maximize its contingency planning but noted that in the absence of a successful Abuja outcome and GNU consent, the Council 'faces a stark choice,' given the GNU's failure to exercise its responsibility to protect its population.

111. (C) Japan joined the call for immediately dispatching the assessment team and questioned whether the GNU's 'mistrust' of the UN was a genuine concern or merely a pretext. The Japanese DPR asked about any UN public relations strategy to counter this problem; the SYG said such an effort would not be effective, given the centralized nature of the Khartoum regime. Argentine PR Mayoral recommended the Council send unequivocal messages to Khartoum that the incoming UN force would not be a 'crusade' and that the UN would not abandon the Darfur civilian population. Slovakian PR Burian asked about a rumored visit by Sudanese FM Lam Akol, which the SYG said had not yet been scheduled.

¶12. (C) Tanzanian DPR Manongi warned that if Abuja failed to restore peace in Darfur, the Council should be ready to respond, making a UN role all the more critical and AMIS transition planning all the more urgent. Manongi suggested the Council issue a strong statement on the necessity of GNU cooperation and the urgency of its acceptance of the UN assessment team. The Congolese PR declared he did not share the Council's concept of urgency and would not associate his delegation with any initiative that was 'hasty' or that risked angering the GNU. Similarly, Chinese PR and SC President Wang advised that open pressure on the GNU would not succeed; to deal effectively with Khartoum, Members must make the GNU feel 'equal' to the Council and not portray it as 'the bad guy.'

NEXT STEPS

¶13. (SBU) We are still awaiting release of the SYG Report on Sudan, originally due April 24 but delayed at least until early May as a result of Khartoum's refusal to grant access to the assessment team. According to the draft calendar for May (when Congo will hold the UNSC Presidency), Sudan consultations will be May 5; SRSB Pronk will be in New York and is likely to brief.
BOLTON